

SAMPLE REPORT — illustrative only. The target company, codebase metrics, and findings below are a fictional composite for demonstration purposes and do not describe any real company or engagement. A live engagement is generated directly from access to the target's actual repository.

Technical Due Diligence Report

Full Technical Diligence (T2) · Sample Report · Prepared for Deal Team Review

TARGET (REDACTED)	SECTOR	CODEBASE SIZE
Project Meridian	B2B vertical SaaS	~86,000 LOC
PRIMARY STACK	REPOSITORIES SCANNED	REPORT TIER
Node.js / React / PostgreSQL	4	T2 — Full Diligence

01 Executive Summary

OVERALL RISK RATING			
MODERATE	3 Critical findings	\$185K–\$260K Est. remediation cost	6–9 mo Engineer-months to remediate

Project Meridian's codebase is in line with what we'd expect from a company at this stage — functional, revenue-generating, and not architecturally broken — but carries three findings that should factor into deal terms: an unpatched critical CVE in a payment-adjacent dependency, concentrated ownership of the billing module in a single engineer, and a database schema that will need rework before the growth case in the model is reachable. None of these are deal-breakers on their own; together they represent a quantifiable body of post-close work that is not currently reflected in the asking price.

Recommendation: Proceed, with \$185K–\$260K in remediation costs and a 60-day talent retention plan for the lead payments engineer factored into deal terms or a post-close holdback.

02 Security Exposure

Risk rating: **HIGH** — driven primarily by finding S-1. Full scan covered 4 repositories, 212 dependencies, and CI/CD configuration.

SEVERITY	FINDING	EST. FIX EFFORT
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Critical	Unpatched critical CVE in payment webhook dependency A transitive dependency used in the Stripe webhook handler has a known critical-severity CVE (remote code execution), unpatched for 14 months. Direct exposure on a payment-adjacent code path.	3–5 days
High	No rate limiting on authentication endpoints Login and password-reset endpoints have no throttling, enabling credential-stuffing and account-enumeration attacks at scale.	1–2 days
High	Long-lived AWS credentials in CI configuration history A prior commit exposed static AWS keys in CI config; keys have since been rotated but exposure window and blast radius were not previously assessed.	1 day + IAM audit
Medium	Inconsistent tenant-scoping on 3 internal admin endpoints Three internal-only admin routes do not re-verify organization scope server-side, relying on client-side checks.	2–3 days
Low	11 dependencies with known low/medium-severity CVEs Standard patch-cadence backlog — no direct exploit path identified in this codebase.	2 days

03 Technical Debt

Debt is concentrated in two legacy subsystems rather than spread evenly — the newer product surface (roughly 70% of the codebase, shipped in the last 18 months) is in good health.

SEVERITY	FINDING	EST. FIX EFFORT
High	Billing module: 42% branch coverage, no integration tests on refund path The module handling proration and refunds — directly revenue-relevant — has meaningfully lower test coverage than the rest of the codebase (team avg. 78%).	4–6 weeks
Medium	Legacy jQuery admin panel maintained in parallel with the React app ~9,000 LOC of pre-2021 admin tooling still in active use; no clean migration path currently scheduled.	6–8 weeks
Medium	Duplicated invoicing logic across API and background-job layers Two independent implementations of tax calculation have drifted; one was patched for a EU VAT edge case, the other was not.	1–2 weeks
Flag	No dependency-update process; 34 packages >18 months out of date Not urgent individually, but raises the cost and risk of any future major-version migration.	Ongoing

04 Talent Concentration Risk

Risk rating: **HIGH** on one subsystem; low elsewhere.

68% of commits to the billing/payments module in the trailing 12 months came from a single engineer, who — per the data room — is not identified as part of the post-close retention plan. Bus-factor on this module is effectively 1. The remaining codebase shows healthy distribution across a 6-person engineering team, with no single contributor exceeding 24% of commits in any other module.

Recommendation: Structure a retention incentive or a minimum 60-day transition/consulting period for this engineer as a condition of close, and budget knowledge-transfer documentation as part of the technical debt line item above.

05 Architecture & Scalability

Rating: **Will hold through Series B growth assumptions in the model; re-architecture required before Series C scale.**

- Current PostgreSQL schema uses a single-tenant-per-row multi-tenancy model that begins to show query latency degradation past ~2M active end-users in comparable deployments — the growth case in the model reaches this range in year 3.
- No read-replica or caching layer currently in front of the primary database for the highest-traffic endpoints; straightforward to add, not yet done.
- Background job processing is on a single-queue, single-worker-pool design; adequate today, a known constraint if transaction volume grows as projected.

06 Remediation Cost Estimate

LINE ITEM	EST. COST	ENGINEER-TIME
Security findings (S-1 through S-5)	\$25,000 – \$35,000	2–3 weeks
Billing module test coverage & refund-path hardening	\$60,000 – \$85,000	4–6 weeks
Legacy admin panel migration	\$70,000 – \$95,000	6–8 weeks
Invoicing logic consolidation	\$15,000 – \$25,000	1–2 weeks
Talent transition / knowledge-transfer plan	\$15,000 – \$20,000	Concurrent
Total	\$185,000 – \$260,000	6–9 engineer-months

Cost estimates assume a blended fully-loaded engineer rate consistent with the target's existing team composition and geography, not a premium consulting rate.

07 Methodology

Generated by audit/bench's LLM-plus-static-analysis review engine against the target's repositories, dependency manifests, and CI/CD configuration, with findings reviewed for business relevance before inclusion. This sample uses anonymized, fictionalized data for illustration; a live engagement report is built directly from access to the target's actual codebase under NDA.